The Blog

NoodleFood

The Onion Is Not Satire

 Posted by on 25 June 2013 at 4:00 pm  GLBT, Law, Marriage, Politics, Rights
Jun 252013
 

… not this piece, anyway: Impatient Nation Demands Supreme Court Just Get To The Gay Stuff:

WASHINGTON—Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in an ongoing affirmative action lawsuit Monday, the impatient American public reportedly demanded that the nation’s highest court stop jerking around with all these other cases and just get to the gay stuff already.

The last line put me into stitches of laughter, such that Paul had to remind me to breathe:

At press time, the nation had thrown up its hands in frustration upon learning that the Supreme Court was currently preparing a 46-page opinion addressing the jurisdictional conflicts raised by Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett.

 The Onion Is Not Satire  No Responses »

Paul Hsieh Forbes OpEd: 3D-Printed Guns Could Be Good For America

 Posted by on 10 May 2013 at 2:00 pm  Activism, Firearms, Law, Politics
May 102013
 

The May 7, 2013 online edition of Forbes published my latest OpEd, “Why 3D-Printed Untraceable Guns Could Be Good For America“.

Here is the opening:

In the past few days, Forbes writer Andy Greenberg broke a pair of dramatic stories on Cody Wilson’s quest to build an untraceable plastic gun using commercially available 3D-printing technology. First, Greenberg published exclusive photos of the completed firearm, then he reported on a successful test firing of a live .380 cartridge.

Although the technology is still in its infancy, Wilson’s innovation has already sparked heated debate. Some gun rights advocates (including Wilson) argue this means current gun laws will soon be obsolete. They welcome the fact that home hobbyists may soon be able to build functioning firearms without any background check or government record. Others are alarmed, concerned that this would enable criminals to more easily obtain firearms. Congressman Steve Israel has already stated his intent to modify current laws to ban such guns.

However, Congressman Israel may be too late. Once thousands of motivated hobbyists start downloading open source gun designs and posting their refinements, we’ll likely see rapid technical advances. But Cody Wilson’s real impact on America may not be technological but political — and in a good way…

(Read the full text of “Why 3D-Printed Untraceable Guns Could Be Good For America“.)

 Paul Hsieh Forbes OpEd: 3D-Printed Guns Could Be Good For America  1 Response »

The Lone Juror

 Posted by on 22 April 2013 at 10:00 am  Crime, Law, Racism
Apr 222013
 

This is an amazing story of a lone juror who refused to convict a black man of rape based on flimsy evidence, despite pressure by the prosecutor. The actual rapist confessed to the crime a few months later. (I’ve left the spelling and grammatical errors as is.)

In 1994 I was called to be a jury in a rape case. A black man had supposedly attacked a young woman in a park, and raped her. He was apprehended by the police only hours later and faced up to 30 years in jail (including aggravated assault). I received the letter one morning and immediately was angry at it as it would waste much of my time in the coming months. However, I have a strong sense of honor, and felt it was my duty.

The interview was kind of weird. After the first questions by the judge, both parties went to ask questions about me and my opinions. First, the defendant had a public defendant who asked me almost no questions (for those not familiar with the law, with a jury trial, both parties select jury members according to strict rules). The prosecutor was very direct and, in my mind, completely unethical. He asked me some VERY direct questions. It went something like this:

PROSECUTION: Hello sir Glad to see you here. In your mind, do you think the defendant is guilty or not? ME: Uhhhh… I don’t know, I didn’t hear all the case details… PROSECUTION: Yes, but considering he was arrested by the police and they have a whole file on him… ME: I will wait to see the whole file on him.

At this point, I understood something. If I acted like I was racist, surely would they dismiss me from being part of the jury!! I thought about it for a second, thought about the month of underpaid work I’d saved, and decided it was worth a shot.

PROSECUTION: Consider the defendant. Do you think his ‘situation’ make him more likely to commit this crime? ME: Huhh… I don’t know… PROSECUTION: A poor woman was viciously attacked, beat and raped. I think we can both agree it was a horrible crime? ME: Yes, absolutely. PROSECUTION: She described the man exactly as he is standing there. He was arrested and interrogated by the police. Do you agree this man might have committed this crime? ME: Yes, I do. PROSECUTION: What is your view on black people? ME(lies): Not particularly dislike them, but not particularly like them. PROSECUTION: Explain? ME(lies): They are human and they have a right to live, but I don’t see them exactly like us.

The prosecution party seemed satisfied of the answers. Keep in mind this was in front of the judge and at this point I was 100% sure I would be dismissed, with a “RACIST” tag over my head forever.

Not at all.

I was informed a bit later, to my great surprise, that I would be part of the jury. If I could describe the case in one word, it would be: “long”. It was terribly long. Hours and hours passed, hours became days and days became weeks. Then, each parties had its final hearing. To my surprise, the public defendant was doing a very decent job in front of the prosecution party.

Then, we went inside, all 12 of us, to discuss.

I had made my mind close to the end of the trial. He was not guilty. There was definitely not enough evidence to convict him. The woman had given (a really tearful) testimony but admitted she couldn’t identify him. The police, after a few questions, had to admit they had no prior file of this man. An expert psychiatrist, hired by the defense, said the man was “happily married with childrens and unlikely to commit that kind of crime. But what really helped me make my mind was when the police admitted they had no DNA evidence at all (which was kind of new at the time). However, the police had a signed confession (which I supposed coerced) and the women had identified a mark the defendant had on the bottom of the neck. Also, he had no alibis and was, to his admission, “walking around at the time”. Finally, a witness supposedly saw a man running away with the same clothes as the defendant.

The jury hearing looked like it would last less than an hour. By the 45-minutes mark, most jury member had made their minds: he was guilty. By the 1h15 mark, all jury members decided he was guilty.

Except for me.

I still wasn’t convinced. I told them I would say he was not guilty. Everyone sighed. “For christ-sake this is the 5th time we vote, I think it’s time we decide already”. We kept talking, and one jury member even got mad: “ARE YOU SAYING THE 11 OF US ARE WRONG? Look at us, there are women and men alike here. This guy IS guilty.” One even told me I was a “nigger-defendant” which made me doubt of the composition of the jury.

The day ended and we all went home.

I spent the night without sleeping. In the morning, I was even more sure: he was not guilty. And then came the second day, long as hell. A fat man became seriously mad and asked to get out (which he couldn’t). I could feel, at the end of the day, that they were all mad at me.

Then came the third day and the 1235235th vote. Again, we failed to reach consensus. They all guessed who voted not guilty. Then, one man flipped out.

MAN: Look out son. I don’t know what your freaking problem is… We have his confession. The woman identified him. A FREAKING WITNESS SAW HIM! What the fuck do you need? ME: I am not convinced by any of the evidence.

Then, things became weirder. The prosecution attorney came to talk to me. To my surprise, he was very kind to me.

PROSECUTION: Hey sir,I heard you thought the defendant was not guilty? ME: WHAT??? Sir, this is supposed to be confidential! PROSECUTION: And it will. Behind us. Sir, I just want to tell this: twenty police officers worked on it. Twenty. I wouldn’t take a man to trial without the absolute proof he is guilty. ME: Thanks… I will consider it…

But I already made up my mind. Fourth day passed and at this point no one was talking. At the end of the fifth day, the judge made us all appear in front of us. Every jury member was looking at me.

JUDGE: Has the jury reached a verdict? CHIEF JURY: No, your honor. JUDGE (really surprised): Do you need more time to reach a verdict? CHIEF JURY: No, your honor. JUDGE: You… You don’t think you can reach a verdict? CHIEFT JURY: No, your honor.

Everyone in the audience sighed. Not one second I put my head down. After a couple of days, a hung jury verdict was given. And everything was to be started again. My life took a turn to the worst, I was bullied, intimidated in my life. My car was frequently arrested by patrolling police officers for no reason. I started to think about moving out.

Two months later, before the new trial began, a man confessed to the crime at a police station. He was also black, although looked nothing like the first man, even in terms of weight/height. He gave a crying confession to which he admitted everything. Then, he gave details that were kept private (not shared with any outsider) and that he could in no way know unless he was the perpretator of the crime. He said he followed the long trial, and was tortured thinking about everything that happened. When the woman saw him, she immediately said it was him, and I had the feeling police told her it was the first black man who did it.

Later on he was convicted, served a prison time, and was released after many years. Sorry to make this so long. AMA.

I’m floored that this guy was selected for the jury despite expressing racist sentiments. I’m even more floored that the prosecutor attempted to pressure him into changing his vote during deliberations. Surely, that’s waaaay out-of-bounds, right?

 The Lone Juror  3 Responses »

Some Arguments Against Gay Marriage

 Posted by on 5 April 2013 at 2:00 pm  GLBT, Law, Marriage, Objectivist Movement, Politics
Apr 052013
 

On Sunday’s Philosophy in Action Radio, I’ll answer a question on whether “gay marriage” should be considered a kind of marriage. (Hint: The right answer is “HELL YES.”) In the process, I’ll explain why civil unions might be a step in the right direction, but they’re not an acceptable alternative to legalizing gay marriage.

Lately, along with everyone else on Facebook, I’ve seen a wide variety of arguments about gay marriage… some better and some worse.

From my libertarian friends, I often hear that the government should “get out of the business of marriage” entirely. That view is wrong, for reasons that I explained in this podcast: State Involvement in Marriage. Basically, the state should not give marriage licenses, but rather ought to treat marriage as a private contract. As with every other kind of contract, the govenment provides the basic legal framework — including establishing the meaning of terms, setting defaults for when terms are not specified, establishing standards for consent, and so on. Moreover, the state will have to determine what counts as a valid marriage contract, so that those standards and defaults might be applied, just as it does for employment contracts. That definition of marriage (and other contractual relations) should not be arbitrary, but rather based on the fact of fundamental similarities in the nature of various relationships between people.

What I find particularly objectionable, however, is when people refuse to support gay marriage due to this view that the state ought to “get out of the business of marriage” entirely. The fact is that legalizing gay marriage would rid our legal system of a major injustice, without impeding the fight for a fully contractual system of marriage. To oppose the former because you want the latter is rather like saying, “I’m opposed to ending brutal corporal punishment of children in government schools because I’m opposed to all government schools.” Political changes that are for the better — that genuinely advance the cause of liberty — can and should be supported, even if not immediately the ideal.

Even worse, however, is the outright opposition to gay marriage that I’ve seen from some supposed Objectivists, particularly in this blog post and its comments. The arguments offered are so weak as to be laughable. Ultimately, they’re based on negative judgments of homosexuality, morally and psychologically, and those judgments are rooted in nothing more than repugnance. (That’s not an inference: it’s quite explicit from the blog post and its comments.)

Thankfully, that kind of irrational bias against gays is far, far, far less common among Objectivists than in years past. Still, I hate to see it… ever.

Update: As promised, I surveyed the various quasi-secular arguments against gay marriage on the 7 April 2013 episode of Philosophy in Action Radio. If you’ve not yet heard it, you can listen to or download the podcast segment here:

For more details, check out the question’s archive page. The full episode – where I answered questions on the validity of gay marriage, the is-ought gap, the aftermath of a friendship, mixing politics and romance, and more – is available as a podcast too.

 Some Arguments Against Gay Marriage  19 Responses »

Stephen Bailey’s Proposed Constitutional Amendment

 Posted by on 20 March 2013 at 8:35 pm  Law, Politics
Mar 202013
 

Just moments ago, I finished interviewing Stephen Bailey on his proposal for a constitutional amendment to enable the people to limit the power of government. He read through the amendment and explained it well during the interview, but I thought it would be useful to post the text here for people to refer to as well.

So here it is… and don’t forget to listen to the interview!

The right of the people to annul unconstitutional law shall not be infringed.

Any person may bring suit challenging the constitutionality of any legislation, regulation, or rule enacted or promulgated by any government within the State of Colorado, except items consisting solely of appropriations.

Any person subject to the challenged legislation shall have standing to bring such a suit in a court within the governing jurisdiction of the law and that court shall have jurisdiction to hear the suit.

Such suits shall be heard by a jury composed of twelve jurors, randomly selected from the eligible electors residing in the judicial district in which the suit is brought. Jurors shall be disqualified and may only be disqualified due to demonstrated conflict of interest.

Unless two-thirds of a jury shall find the law a necessary and proper exercise of power delegated by this Constitution, and not infringing unalienable individual rights protected by this Constitution or the Constitution of the United States, the law shall be annulled.

Any appeal of a jury annulment shall comply with the requirements specified herein.

All convictions under a nullified law shall be immediately voided.

The jury may separately find, through a simple majority vote, that the public officials who enacted an annulled law wantonly violated their oath to protect and defend this constitution and, therefore, are ineligible to hold elective or appointed public office in the State of Colorado. This disability shall be effective upon completion of the term of a currently held elected public office, or immediately if not currently holding an elected public office. No public official shall be held accountable for approving or enacting a law, regulation or rule prior to the ratification of this amendment.

 Stephen Bailey’s Proposed Constitutional Amendment  1 Response »

The Moral Implications of Lance Armstrong’s Possible Confession to Doping

 Posted by on 7 January 2013 at 10:00 am  Defamation, Drug War, Ethics, Law, Rights, Sports
Jan 072013
 

The New York Times reports that Lance Armstrong is considering confessing to doping in order to resume his athletic career:

Lance Armstrong, who this fall was stripped of his seven Tour de France titles for doping and barred for life from competing in all Olympic sports, has told associates and antidoping officials that he is considering publicly admitting that he used banned performance-enhancing drugs and blood transfusions during his cycling career, according to several people with direct knowledge of the situation. He would do this, the people said, because he wants to persuade antidoping officials to restore his eligibility so he can resume his athletic career.

As I explained in this Philosophy in Action Radio discussion of performance-enhancing drugs in sports, the government has no business banning performance-enhancing drugs. Moreover, the case for a ban in in private sports leagues is remarkably weak. That’s here:

Alas, the problem for Armstrong is that his years of vehement denials of using performance-enhancing drugs, if admitted to be false, would embroil him in major legal troubles. The concern is not merely unjust prosecution by the government. His contracts with sponsors depended on his not using performance-enhancing drugs, and as the the article explains, some sponsors are seeking to recoup millions. Moreover — and this is what I find so morally distasteful — he might have ill-gotten gains from libel lawsuits too:

Armstrong is also facing two other civil lawsuits, one that involves the Dallas-based insurance company SCA Promotions, which is trying to recoup at least $5 million it covered when Armstrong won multiple Tours.

The company withheld that $5 million bonus from Armstrong after he won the 2004 Tour because of doping accusations that surfaced in the book “L.A. Confidentiel: Les Secrets de Lance Armstrong,” which was published in France. Armstrong sued the company, and the case was settled for $7.5 million.

Armstrong is also being sued by the British newspaper The Sunday Times over the settlement of a libel case in which the newspaper paid Armstrong nearly $500,000.

I don’t fault Armstrong for doping, nor for lying about that to a quasi-governmental agency. However, if he sued people for millions for telling the truth about his doping… well, that’s remarkably sleazy. Even if he felt backed into a corner, that’s no excuse for abusing the law in order to intimidate people into silence.

When faced with such difficult circumstances, the moral person changes course: he admits what he did openly, he defends himself by explaining his reasons, and he advocates for changes in the law. He does not sacrifice others by violating their rights. To do that means sliding rapidly down a very dangerous and degrading slippery slope. That slippery slope doesn’t just destroy a person’s character, but also undermines any capacity of mine to admire his achievements.

I really, really, really hope that that’s not what we’re seeing from Lance Armstrong now.

 The Moral Implications of Lance Armstrong’s Possible Confession to Doping  7 Responses »

Irish Newspapers Attempt to Self-Destruct

 Posted by on 2 January 2013 at 10:00 am  Intellectual Property, Law, Media
Jan 022013
 

2012: The year Irish newspapers tried to destroy the web:

This year the Irish newspaper industry asserted, first tentatively and then without any equivocation, that links -just bare links like this one- belonged to them. They said that they had the right to be paid to be linked to. They said they had the right to set the rates for those links, as they had set rates in the past for other forms of licensing of their intellectual property. And then they started a campaign to lobby for unauthorised linking to be outlawed.

These assertions were not merely academic positions. The Newspaper Industry (all these newspapers) had its agent write out demanding money. They wrote to Women’s Aid, (amongst others) who became our clients when they received letters, emails and phone calls asserting that they needed to buy a licence because they had linked to articles in newspapers carrying positive stories about their fundraising efforts. These are the prices for linking they were supplied with:

1 – 5 €300.00
6 – 10 €500.00
11 – 15 €700.00
16 – 25 €950.00
26 – 50 €1,350.00
50 + Negotiable

They were quite clear in their demands. They told Women’s Aid “a licence is required to link directly to an online article even without uploading any of the content directly onto your own website.”

Recap: The Newspapers’ agent demanded an annual payment from a women’s domestic violence charity because they said they owned copyright in a link to the newspapers’ public website.

This isn’t the case of a collection agent going rogue.

The National Newspapers of Ireland is the representative body for Irish Newspaper Publishers.

Go read the rest of the article.

Many, many things irritate me about this abuse of intellectual property by Irish newspapers, but what really gets my goat is these news web sites could easily block deep linking via their webserver settings… but they choose not to do that. Why not? Obviously, because they actually want those deep links: they depend on that traffic. Still, their business model is failing. So, in a particularly nasty fit of short-sighted pragmatism, they’ve invented an utterly ridiculous legal claim of copyright infringement to compel those providers of traffic to pay them ridiculous sums of money after the fact. It’s just appalling.

The good news is that (1) I can’t imagine that any courts will uphold these claims and (2) if they do, the result will only be the utter obliteration of Irish newspapers from the face of the earth. You asked for it, brothers!

 Irish Newspapers Attempt to Self-Destruct  1 Response »

Banning the Veil?

 Posted by on 19 December 2012 at 10:00 am  Free Society, Islam, Law, Politics, Religion, Rights
Dec 192012
 

Might the government of a free society ever be justified in banning the veil? I’m on the fence on the issue. In some cases, I’d say — very tentatively — that such a ban might be justified as a means of protecting rights. How so?

First, I don’t think that the veil could be banned on the grounds that it represents some kind of threat, implicit or otherwise. The veil signals the subjugation of women, not jihad. In contrast, the mere wearing of KKK garb is clearly an unspoken threat in certain circumstances, such as when a parade of clansmen march up and down the street of a new black family in the neighborhood. Such would be cause for vigorous investiation, if not arrests.

The case of the veil is far more similar to the following scenario:

Imagine that people from a certain far-away country keep chattel slaves. This slavery is not merely permitted by law, but encouraged by most of the culture as just and proper. Those slaves are marked not by their skin color, but rather by certain kinds of jewelry — loose manacles that limited movement and a mouthguard that prevents most speech. If seen without the manacles and mouthguard in public, a slave would be severely beaten, if not killed.

Some people from the slave country immigrate to a free nation. In free nation, chattel slavery is absolutely forbidden and regarded with abhorrence. Nonetheless, some of those immigrants bring their slaves with them — and keep them as slaves, out of the sight of the law. These slaves are so ignorant of their proper freedoms that they don’t know that they have rights, nor how to seek assistance from the law. Also, some slaves think that slavery is their proper condition in life, due to being raised with that ideology beaten into them, literally and figuratively. Of those who want to live free, they fear that any attempt at escape would mean death: they know that their owners, aided by other immigrants from the slave country, would seek them and likely kill them.

Law enforcement in the free nation works diligently to identify and free any chattel slaves imported into the country, as well as prosecute the slaveowners. However, because the immigrant community from the slave country is so insular, that government is unable to do so effectively. Slaves — in their manacles and mouthguards — can be seen walking the streets. If these slaves are questioned about their condition by law enforcement or others, they’ll deny that they’re slaves. They’ll say that they’re wearing the jewelry of their own free choice. Some will have a look of fear in their eyes. Others will warmly defend the jewelry as a positive good because they don’t want to move or speak much.

At its wits end and unwilling to tolerate slavery within its borders, the government of the free country bans the manacles and mouthguards as tools and symbols of slavery. They hope that the slaves — freed from the restrictions of their jewelry — will be able to interact with other people in society in normal ways and thereby escape their bondage. Of course, howls of protest are heard from the immigrant community, including from some slaves, about this violation of their rights to wear what jewelry they please.

However, the government argues that to wear the jewelry is to be a slave — symbolically and in fact. The clear symbolic meaning of the jewelry — as well as its isolating effect on a person — cannot be ignored. The manacles and mouthguard are not just some wacky jewelry: they’re part and parcel of a massive violation of rights. In addition, the government cannot know that those who claim to want to wear the jewelry actually want to do so of their own free choice, precisely because the jewelry marks a slave. The word of a person wearing the jewelry might actually be coerced by his or her master. Hence, the government bans the wearing of that particular kind of jewelry.

Is that just and proper? Perhaps so.

A proper government must doggedly protect the rights of all people within its jurisdiction. Apart from murder, slavery is the worst possible violation of those rights. Slavery cannot be tolerated, nor can slavery be voluntary. To speak of the derivative rights of the slave — like the right to wear certain jewelry — is sheer nonsense. Given the violation of his fundamental rights, that can only mean the “right” of his master to force him to wear the jewelry, if the master pleases. Only once the slaves are free people — free from the domination of and violence by another — can the question of their right to wear jewelry be sensibly discussed, because only then can they do so or not of their own choice, rather than by force or permission.

Hence, I doubt that to ban the jewelry would be a violation of rights — or perhaps, it’s a minor and temporary violation of a trivial right for the sake of securing the fundamental liberty. A person must be free of slavery — free of forcible domination by the will of another — before he can be free to choose anything else, including what to wear.

Similarly, millions of women living in Muslim countries and enclaves elsewhere exist in virtual slavery to their fathers, brothers, and husbands at present. Some women embrace that subjugation, yet it’s still indefensible. The veil is part of parcel of that slavery: the veil is a symbol of subjugation, as well as a means of isolating women from the broader culture in which they live. Many women are forced to veil themselves, under threat of violence.

So to speak of the “right to veil” ignores the fact that these women are not yet free to refuse to veil. They must be freed from their subjugation before they can exercise a free choice to veil or not. That might require banning the veil for a time, to allow them to become full-fledged members of the society.

Notably, I don’t think that banning the veil could be justified in the United States at present: most Muslim women are free to veil or not, as they see fit. I’m more sympathetic to bans on the veil in Europe, as the subjugation of Muslim women within Muslim enclaves is a serious problem. Even there, however, other measures might be far more effective — better policing, shelters from women fleeing their homes, posters informing women of their rights, and so on. I’m more inclined to support banning the veil in Muslim countries seeking to westernize — and hence, liberate their women from bondage. It’s a minor measure, and instantly liberating for many women. Alas, such might force women from devout families into complete seclusion, which would be worse. Hence, even in such circumstances, different measures might be more effective.

As I said, I’m up in the air. What do you think?

 Banning the Veil?  12 Responses »

Preliminary Thoughts on Defamation

 Posted by on 16 October 2012 at 12:00 pm  Defamation, Free Speech, Justice, Law, Rights
Oct 162012
 

Last week, I was chatting with my friend Santiago about the validity of defamation laws. Just to get everyone on the same page, Wikipedia summarizes defamation as follows:

Defamation — also called calumny, vilification, traducement, slander (for transitory statements), and libel (for written, broadcast, or otherwise published words) — is the communication of a statement that makes a claim, expressly stated or implied to be factual, that may give an individual, business, product, group, government, religion, or nation a negative or inferior image.

I’m particularly interested in this topic because I have a question on it in the Philosophy in Action Queue that I’d like to answer sooner rather than later. Here’s my current thinking on the matter, and I’d be interested in people’s thoughts in response.

I can understand that a person might be deeply distraught to be harassed by people telling bald-faced lies about him, particularly when that costs him well-earned business. I can understand the desire to recover damages for those losses. However, even if a person should be able to do that, I’m doubtful that defamation should be a legally actionable tort in a free society. Why?

First, defamation laws are too often used as a weapon to silence criticism — meaning, to violate free speech rights. If a person dislikes the criticisms of others — even if those criticisms are completely justified by the facts — he can can sue (or threaten to sue) others into silence. Alas, I have personal experience with such abuses. The cost in time, money, and anxiety of defending yourself against a false claim of defamation is ginormous.

The fact that defamation lawsuits — or the threat thereof — silence speech important for living life should be deeply troubling. People should be free to speak out about their experiences with incompetent doctors, shady contractors, dishonest businesses, and the like without fear of legal reprisals. Such speech is critical to living life well, yet under defamation laws, people engage in such speech at their peril.

Second, if a person unjustly attacks your reputation, defending yourself is almost always pretty easy. You simply have to say that the person is mistaken or lying, then state the facts. (Many staunch defenders of defamation laws are unwilling to do that, I’ve found: they see themselves as above any such explanations to the unwashed masses.) You can also ask forums hosting the defamatory speech to remove it or not permit more of it. Sure, some people will believe the lies, but most people worth knowing or dealing with will not just swallow them. Reasonable people will listen to you. I know that from far too much personal experience too.

Third, notwithstanding those practical conerns, the critical question about the validity of defamation laws concerns the nature and scope of rights. To wit: Does a person have a right to a factually accurate reputation?

A person’s reputation is the sum of the judgments that others make of him: it’s “the beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone or something.” As such, a person cannot be entitled to a certain reputation by right. A person can influence his reputation by his words and deeds, but it’s not his property because ultimately, a person’s reputation consists of judgments in the minds of others. It’s their property, in fact.

Certainly, some people believe ridiculous claims about me — yet they’re not violating my rights in doing so. They’re just jerks or chumps, but hey, that’s their right. I don’t have a right to anyone’s good opinion, even if that’s what I deserve morally. People are entitled to believe whatever they damn well please — and, I think, to say pretty much whatever they damn well please too. Yes, that speech might do me damage, but so does the speech of pastors and politicians.

Ultimately, I don’t see any basis for claims of a right to reputation. Hence, at least right now, I don’t see that defamation laws can be justified.

Thoughts?

 Preliminary Thoughts on Defamation  28 Responses »

Questions for the Colorado Supreme Court in CSG’s Lawsuit

 Posted by on 9 October 2012 at 11:00 am  Activism, Campaign Finance, Coalition for Secular Government, Free Speech, Law
Oct 092012
 

On October 2nd, the Center for Competitive Politics posted a press release about the questions that Judge Kane is sending to the Colorado Supreme Court for CSG’s campaign finance lawsuit. It’s very interesting news, because until very recently, I didn’t even know that this could be part of the legal process. (Look, it’s federalism in action! Nifty!)

CONTACT: Sarah Lee, Communications Director, 770.598.7961

ALEXANDRIA, Va. – A federal judge today issued an order seeking clarification by the Colorado Supreme Court of the state’s campaign finance laws. Senior Judge John L. Kane of the United States Court for the District of Colorado asked the state Supreme Court to “provide clear guidance… as to the scope and meaning” of provisions that have been challenged under the First Amendment to the US Constitution

Judge Kane’s order was made in connection with a case brought by the Center for Competitive Politics (CCP) on behalf of the Coalition for Secular Government (CSG). The case, over which Judge Kane presides, is Coalition for Secular Government v. Gessler, No. 12-cv-1708.

The judge’s order noted that the “lawsuit raises First Amendment challenges to several provisions of Colorado campaign finance law that remain undefined by the Colorado Constitution, Article XXVIII’s implementing legislation, or caselaw from Colorado courts.”

CSG alleges that, even though it plans to raise no more than $3,500–nearly all of which will go toward updating and disseminating a public policy paper–the state constitution appears to demand that CSG register as an issue committee if its papers take a position on ballot measures. Such registration would force CSG to maintain several new types of records, file periodic reports, turn over the names and addresses of contributors who donate as little as $20 toward financing the policy paper, and risk substantial fines should it err in its public filings.

Judge Kane certified four questions. These include:

  • Does the Colorado Constitution treat money spent on a policy paper, including one that suggests how the reader should vote on a ballot initiative, as the equivalent of money spent on political ads?
  • Does the state constitution entitle policy papers distributed over the internet to be treated in the same way as newspaper and magazine editorials for purposes of campaign finance law?
  • In light of a federal decision declaring certain groups too small to be regulated by the state of Colorado, what is the monetary trigger for an issue committee under the state constitution? Is it the roughly-$1,000 mentioned in the federal opinion? The $3,500 contemplated by CSG? The $200 mentioned in the constitution itself? Or another number altogether?
While the Colorado Supreme Court is not required to answer Judge Kane’s questions, doing so would provide some welcome guidance on these important questions.

“For years, organizations in Colorado have been unsure how to comply with Colorado’s campaign finance rules, or have been subject to politically-motivated complaints for making minor errors,” CCP Legal Director Allen Dickerson said. “Some choose not to speak at all in the face of this situation. The Colorado Supreme Court now has the option of bringing a measure of predictability to some of the state constitution’s more difficult provisions.”

Judge Kane’s order, which includes a brief description of the case, may be found here.

Here are the four questions certified in their technical language:

1. Is the policy paper published by the Coalition for Secular Government (CSG) in 2010 “express advocacy” under Art. XXVIII, S 2(8)(a) of the Colorado Constitution?

2. If the policy paper is express advocacy, does it qualify for the press exemption found at Art. XXVIII, S 2(8)(b)?

3. Is the policy paper a “written or broadcast communication” under S 1-45-103(12)(b)(II)(B), C.R.S.? If not, did it become a “written or broadcast communication” when it was posted to CSG’s blog or Facebook page?

4. In light of Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010), what is the monetary trigger for Issue Committee status under Art. XXVIII S2(10)(a)(II) of the Colorado Constitution?

I’ll be very interested to see how the Colorado Supreme Court rules on these questions — and then what Judge Kane says about that. I’m excited by the prospect of at least clarifying Colorado campaign finance law, let alone striking down some of its most burdensome elements.

Also, I’ll have some news about the forthcoming updates to Ari Armstrong’s and my 2010 paper — The “Personhood” Movement Is Anti-Life — soon. Although “personhood” won’t be on the ballot in Colorado due insufficient signatures, the movement has grown dramatically in influence over the past year, as seen in the GOP primary. Hence, Ari and I are determined to update the policy paper to reflect that.

Alas, my being so sick last week blew apart our plans. We’ve made a new plan, and it’s a better plan, I think. You can expect some announcements about that later this week. Just know that, once again, we will need your support to make it happen!

 Questions for the Colorado Supreme Court in CSG’s Lawsuit  No Responses »
Page 3 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 … 10 11 Older Entries
Home | Live | Podcasts | Blog | Queue | Connect | Contribute | Search
Copyright Diana Hsieh | Web | Email | Twitter | Facebook

Philosophy in Action's NewsletterPhilosophy in Action's Facebook PagePhilosophy in Action's Twitter StreamPhilosophy in Action's RSS FeedsPhilosophy in Action's Calendar
Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha